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CASENOTES

Detaining Successful Habeas Corpus
Petitioners Due To Dangerousness:
Hilton v. Braunskill
I.

INTRODUCTION

An individual in custody pursuant to a state court's judgment
may obtain release through the federal courts on a petition for habeas
corpus relief.1 A federal court must order the state to release 2a habeas
defect.
petitioner if the state trial contained a constitutional
In addition to ruling on the constitutionality of the state conviction, a federal court must make custody decisions regarding the habeas
petitioner. Custody decisions must be made because, if the habeas
petition is granted, the state may appeal the court's order and move
to stay the habeas petitioner's release pending the appeal. Continued
incarceration after a conviction has been rendered invalid, however,
appears contradictory to the traditional function of the writ due to
the strong liberty interest of a successful habeas petitioner.' The public
1. Congress authorized federal courts to grant the writ of habeas corpus in
the first Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
Habeas corpus is a postconviction writ whose function is to provide a "swift and
imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint and confinement." Braden v. 30th
Judicial Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973). The Judiciary Act of 1789 restricted the
use of the writ to only those in federal custody; See, e.g., Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 103, 105 (1845), and only the jurisdiction of the sentencing court could be
challenged. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879). See generally L.
Yackle, Postconviction Remedies §89, at 358 (1981).
Although habeas corpus relief is available to a federal prisoner who has
exhausted available relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255, this Note will only address the
federal habeas relief available to state prisoners. A federal prisoner convicted of
violating a federal criminal statute may move the sentencing court to vacate, set
aside, or correct the sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 8-14. Although a federal court must
order the state to release a habeas corpus petitioner if a constitutional defect is found,
it may condition such release upon the state's correction of the defect through the
retrial of the petitioner. See infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
3. The petitioner's liberty interest arises from the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. This amendment provides no person shall be "deprived of life,
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safety concerns of the state may prompt it, however, to seek continued
custody of the petitioner pending appeal. 4
In Hilton v. Braunskil' the Supreme Court held the standards
federal courts apply to determine whether to stay civil judgments
pending appeal are now to be used when deciding whether to stay the
release of a successful habeas petitioner pending appeal. 6 Under these
standards, federal courts may consider whether the habeas petitioner
would pose a danger to the public if released.'
This Note will examine the background of the writ of habeas
corpus and the rule governing federal courts when making custody
decisions regarding habeas petitioners pending appellate review. It
examines how the civil stay standards will operate in the habeas
context and whether those standards adequately balance competing

state and individual interests a motion to stay release implicates.

Finally, this Note will examine whether due process concerns prevent

the civil standards from working properly in the habeas context and
whether modifications of those standards would provide more adequate protection of the successful petitioner's liberty interest.

liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT., amend. V. The due
process clause of the fifth amendment prevents unjustified governmental deprivations
of liberty. The clause has been held to preclude punishment prior to an adjudication
of guilt. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986); Wolf v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). Since a successful habeas petitioner's state conviction has
been ruled invalid, see infra note 14, continued incarceration implicates his or her
liberty interest. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (freedom from bodily restraint is the fundamental right
at the core of liberty in the due process clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673-74 (1977) (liberty has always been thought to encompass freedom from bodily
restraint).
4. The state's interest in retaining custody is predicated on its legitimate goal
of maintaining public safety. The primary reason advocated by the state for seeking
a stay of release is its concern that the habeas petitioner will pose a danger to the
community if released pending the state's appeal. See, e.g., Carter v. Rafferty, 781
F.2d 993, 996 (3d Cir. 1986); Braunskill v. Hilton, No. 85-8008 (D.N.J. 1986) (district
court's order denying stay of release). United States ex rel. Taylor v. Redman, 500
F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1980); Sellars v. Estelle, 450 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1977).

5. 107 S.Ct. 2113 (1986).

6. 107 S. Ct. at 2119. For a discussion of the civil stay standards and their
applicability in staying the release of a successful habeas petitioner see infra text
accompanying notes 79-106.
7. Id. For an analysis of the due process implications arising from a consideration of the petitioner's dangerousness in determining whether to stay release see
infra text accompanying notes 107-35.
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II.

BACKGROUND: HABEAS CORPUS AND THE
RULE GOVERNING CUSTODY

The function of the writ of habeas corpus has traditionally been
to secure release from illegal custody.' Under the modern federal
habeas corpus statutes, 9 federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain
a petition for habeas corpus relief brought by or in behalf of state
prisoners.' 0 Through the petition, a state prisoner brings a civil action"
8. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In Brown, the Court stated
of conviction through habeas corpus is not an act of judicial
"[d]ischarge
that
clemency but a protection against illegal custody." Id. at 465. See also Prieser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1976) ("[tlhe traditional function of the writ is to
secure release from illegal custody."). See generally L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 140
at 528.
9. The modern federal habeas corpus statutes are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§

2241-56 (1982).
10. In 1867, Congress expanded federal jurisdiction to issue the writ to include
all cases where any person may be restrained in violation of the Constitution or any
treaty or law of the United States. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385. The
language of this statute was held to include federal habeas relief for state prisoners,
still, however, only the jurisdiction of the sentencing court could be challenged. See
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330-31 (1915). See generally L. Yackle, supra note
1, § 19 at 86; Note, Developments in the Law: FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1038, 1048 (1970).

State prisoners may now raise any and all federal constitutional questions,
except fourth amendment claims, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), on a
petition for habeas corpus relief rather than being restricted to jurisdictional challenges. See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) ("validity of a
conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction
is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it.").
28 U.S.C. § 2254 governs petitions for the writ of habeas corpus brought by or in
behalf of state prisoners to the federal courts. The statute provides:
[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
11. See, e.g., Browder v. Director, Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257,
269 (1978) ("habeas proceedings are civil in nature"); Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174,
181 (1906) ("The proceeding is habeas corpus and is civil and not a criminal
proceeding"); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (the proceedings
under a petition of habeas corpus are in their nature civil proceedings); Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1959) (quoting Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333
(1923) "a writ of habeas corpus is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution
but an independent civil suit").
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in federal court to challenge the legality of his or her imprisonment.2
The focus of a habeas proceeding is not upon the guilt or innocence
of the habeas petitioner. Rather, it is upon the state conviction and
whether it was obtained in violation of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. 3 If the court entertaining the petition determines the state
conviction was constitutionally defective, it must order the state to
release the prisoner from custody.1 4
Since a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief requires the state
conviction be overturned if obtained in violation of constitutional or
federal law, a single district court judge is placed in the position of
being able to overturn the judgment of a state's highest court. 5
12. A habeas proceeding is collateral in nature as it is "not a proceeding for
the correction of [trial] errors." In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 75 (1893). In a federal
habeas proceeding the state prisoner must allege "he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). Through this
allegation the prisoner contends the conviction, for which he or she is now imprisoned,
was obtained in violation of due process rights which may not be infringed by the
state pursuant to fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection. See, e.g., Cupp, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146
(1973); Cuyler, Correctional Superintendent v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1980).
13. See, e.g, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1952) ("District
Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a prisoner had been deprived of liberty
in violation of constitutional rights, although proceedings resulting in incarceration
may be unassailable on the face of the record."); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19,
23-24 (1939).
The writ of habeas corpus has become a means by which to examine the due process
rights afforded criminal defendants in state courts. The writ facilitates the Supreme
Court's interest in uniform application of federal law by providing a vehicle to
examine the extent of due process protections states are giving criminal defendants.
The Court, with its limited resources, could not serve this interest by review of
occasional state court judgments on direct review. See L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 20,
at 95-96.
14. A conviction obtained in violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights
"is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of
imprisonment," Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879). See also Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1963); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90 (1923) See generally
L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 141 at 530-31.
15. See, e.g., Stringer v. Snead, 640 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
988, 993-94 (1981) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting) (not surprising that capable lawyers are
hesitant to serve on state benches since their decisions may be overturned by a single
district judge).
A state prisoner may petition federal Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court in
the first instance for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982), these courts, however,
will generally refer the petition to the appropriate district court. See, e.g., Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944) (per curiam) ("this Court will not ordinarily entertain
an application for the writ before it has been sought and denied in a district court
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Federal review of state prisoner petitions, therefore, strains the 6concept of federalism and has long been the object of controversy.

To soften the impact federal habeas review has on state criminal

processes, the Supreme Court requires a state habeas petitioner to
first exhaust all possible remedies in state courts prior to bringing a
habeas petition in a federal court.' 7 The impact federal habeas review
or denied by a circuit or district judge"). See also FED. R. App. P. 22(a) ("An
application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be made to the appropriate district
court. If application is made to a circuit judge the application will ordinarily be
transferred to the appropriate district court.").
16. See generally, Note, Developments in the Law: FederalHabeas Corpus, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970).
Federalism refers to the division of governmental responsibilities between the
state and federal levels of government. This separation of responsibility is constitutionally prescribed. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to
the United States ... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
Federal habeas review impacts federalism, therefore, because constitutionally prescribed limits of national power gave the states independent status and left them with
the responsibility of the day-to-day governance of their citizens. See, e.g., Friendly,
Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1034 (1977). Though federal habeas
review is necessary to ensure states are meeting constitutionally prescribed limits of
due process in their criminal proceedings, see supra note 13, collateral relitigation of
state court judgments through habeas corpus proceedings denies finality to state
criminal convictions and undermines the rehabilitative and deterrent effects of the
state's criminal law.
State courts must uphold the Constitution and apply federal law when applicable, see Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise in
Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 424 (1961), because of this, a further problem
arises in federal habeas review of state prisoner petitions. If federal courts entertain
state prisoner petitions too readily in order to decide constitutional issues already
ruled upon by the state courts, it might be thought to suggest that state judges are
less than diligent in their discharge of federal obligations.
17. The requirement that state habeas petitioners must first exhaust all possible
remedies in the state courts where convicted prior to seeking federal habeas relief
was fashioned by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). In
Royall, the Court stated "that the public good requires that those relations [between
state and federal courts] be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." Id. at 251.
The exhaustion requirement is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2554(b) & (c) (1982).
The primary purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to preserve and maintain the
principles of federalism and comity. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971) ("The exhaustion of state remedies doctrine . . . reflects a policy of federalstate comity"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982) (the exhaustion doctrine
is required to give state trial courts the opportunity to correct the constitutional
defect and allow state appellate courts the chance to "mend their own fences and
avoid federal intrusion.").
The Court has continued to expand and define the extent to which state habeas
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has on state processes is further reduced by the type of relief a federal
court will generally grant a successful habeas petitioner. Section 2243
of Title 28, United States Code permits a federal court to grant relief
"as law and justice requires' 18 if a petitioner has mounted a successful
attack on the validity of state conviction. As a result, a federal court
will generally order a state to release a successful petitioner within a
specified period of time to give the state an opportunity to correct
the defect by retrying the petitioner.9 These types of orders have been
termed "conditional writs".0 Through conditional writs, federal courts
have somewhat reduced the tensions of federalism because a state
petitioners must exhaust state remedies. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 52022 (1982) (the Court adopted a "total exhaustion" rule which requires the exhaustion
of all possible federal claims in the state courts prior to seeking federal habeas relief);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (federal courts are required to refuse
consideration of constitutional claims from state prisoners when exhaustion has not
occurred due to the petitioner's failure to raise constitutional questions in the manner
prescribed by state procedural rules).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982). The statute reads in pertinent part: "The court
shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and
justice requires." Id.
The Court has interpreted § 2243 and its predecessors as giving federal courts
"the largest power to control and direct the form of judgment to be entered in cases
brought up before it on habeas corpus." In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 261 (1894).
19. See, e.g., In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 261 (1894) ("It would seem that in
the interest of justice and to prevent its defeat, this court might well delay the
discharge of the petitioner for such reasonable time ...to have him taken before
the court where the judgement was rendered"); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,
549 (1961) ("The case is remanded . . . in order to give the State opportunity to retry
the petitioner"). See generally L. Yackle, supra note 1,§ 141 at 531.
The usual time period in which the federal court permits the state to retry the
petitioner is between 60 and 90 days. See, e.g., L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 141 at
531; Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 998 n.6 (1986). Several courts of appeal have
ordered conditional writs to issue when the court below ordered the petitioner's
immediate release. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371, 1380-81 (5th
Cir. 1979); Ridge v. Turner, 444 F.2d 3, 5-6 (10th Cir 1971).
While a federal court may adjudge whether constitutional rights have been
violated so as to render the habeas petitioner's conviction and subsequent confinement
invalid, this power does not allow the court to dictate the manner in which the state
may correct the constitutional defect. See, e.g., Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S.Ct. 689,
699-700 (1986) (the Court should take steps to require the state's own judicial system
to make factual findings in the first instance); United States ex rel. Thomas v. New
Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 744 (3d Cir. 1973) (district court cannot order the state to
entertain bail application of successful petitioner).
20. A "conditional writ" refers to a federal court's order releasing a habeas
petitioner within a specified period of time because the release is conditioned upon
the state's election to retry the petitioner within such time period. See Hilton v.
Braunskill, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2122 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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may keep the habeas 1 petitioner in custody pursuant to its own bail
laws pending retrial.

2

An interesting problem arises, however, when a state attempts to
keep a successful petitioner in custody pending an appeal of the
federal court's issuance of the conditional writ. 22 If a state elects to
follow the federal court's order and retry the prisoner, it may keep
him or her in custody under its own bail laws but it must forego23
appellate review of the federal court's order granting habeas relief.
If the state elects to appeal the conditional writ, it must release the
prisoner at the expiration of the time allotted for retrial unless it can
obtain a stay of release pending appeal. The nature of a conditional
writ, 24 therefore, places the state in an untenable position.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure governs
federal courts in making and modifying the custody orders of habeas
petitioners pending appellate review of an initial decision regarding

21. See, e.g., Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 998 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Since [the
petitioner's] position is now no more or less than that of any other state-indicted,

not-yet-tried individual, . . . the State could follow its normal procedures for imposing

or denying bail"). See also Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2122 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("conditional writs .

.

. turn on fundamental principles of

federal noninterference with the procedures for vindication of state law rights in state
courts").
22. Although federal courts will generally order a conditional writ, see supra
note 20, when granting habeas relief, this type of order has caused some confusion
as to whether it is actually one discharging the prisoner on a petition for habeas
corpus relief. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Lindsey, 202 F.2d 418, 420 (1st Cir. 1953) (holding
that a writ of habeas corpus would issue unless the state retried the petitioner and
that such an order was not one "discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus"); accord,
Lewis v. Henderson, 356 F.2d 105 (6th Cir 1966); United States ex rel. Calhoun v.
Pate, 341 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 945 (1965). While these cases
did not hold that enlargement was improper when a conditional writ was ordered,
they did hold that when the state was allowed a period of time to retry the successful
petitioner, the mandatory release language of the habeas custody rule prior to 1967
did not apply. See infra note 26.
23. If the state initiates retrial proceedings its right to appeal would be
extinguished as a federal court, bound by considerations of comity, would have to
refrain from entertaining an appeal to avoid disrupting the ongoing state proceedings.
See, e.g., Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951) ("If we were to sanction
this intervention, we would expose every State criminal prosecution to insupportable
disruption."); United States ex rel. Abate v. Malcolm, 522 F.2d 826, 827 (2d Cir.
1975) ("While we ate under a duty to exercise federal power in a habeas corpus
proceeding involving a state prisoner, we hesitate to do so when his application may
be granted by the state court.").
24. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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the writ. 25 Under this rule, a presumption arises that a successful
habeas petitioner will be released pending the appellate process. 26 In
25. See FED. R. App. P. 23. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were
prescribed by the Supreme Court on Dec. 4, 1967, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771 &
3772 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 & 2075. They became effective on July 1, 1968.
26. See FED. R. App. P. 23(c). This rule provides in part: "the prisoner shall
be enlarged upon the prisoner's recognizance, with or without surety, unless the court
or justice or judge rendering the decision, or the court of appeals or the Supreme
Court, or a judge or justice of either court shall otherwise order." Id. See, e.g.,
Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (1987) ("Rule 23(c) undoubtedly creates
a presumption of release from custody"); Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 994 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("a petitioner who has established that his confinement is based on an
unconstitutional trial is presumptively entitled to release").
Although some confusion still exists as to whether a conditional writ presumptively entitles the habeas petitioner to release, see supra note 22. See also Marino v.
Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 508 (9th Cir. 1987) ("whether a petitioner granted a
conditional writ falls within the scope of 23(c) or 23(b) . . . release pending appeal

was properly within the scope of the district court's authority"); Walberg v. Israel,
776 F.2d 134, 136 (7th Cir. 1985) (the court stated it could find no cases to govern
it on whether a presumption of release applied to a conditional writ), most courts
apply Rule 23(c) and its corresponding presumption of release; see, e.g., Hill v. Rose,
579 F. Supp. 1080 (M.D. Tn. 1983); Johnson v. Scully, 563 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y.
1983); Cagle v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Taylor v. Redman, 500
F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1980); Sellars v. Estelle, 450 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
United States ex rel. Testamark v. Vincent, 367 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United
States ex rel. Thomas v. State of New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 878 (1973).
The first rule governing custody of successful habeas petitioners pending
appellate review was Supreme Court Rule 34.3. This rule was promulgated in 1886
under the authority of Revised Statutes § 765 which allowed the Court to regulate
habeas proceedings in the federal courts. See Jago v. United States District Court,
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division at Cleveland, 570 F.2d 618 (6th Cir.
1978). This authority included the power to promulgate rules "for the custody and
appearance of the person alleged to be in prison or confined or restrained of his
liberty." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Supreme Court Rule 34.3
provided: "Pending an appeal from the final decision of any court or judge
discharging the prisoner, he shall be enlarged upon recognizance, with surety, for
appearance to answer the judgment of the appellate court, except where, for special
reasons, sureties ought not to be required." 117 U.S. 708. Rule 34.3 was renumbered
and amended a number of times between 1886 and 1980 when it was changed to
Rule 41.3. From 1886 until 1967, however, it retained the mandatory release language.
In 1967 Rule 49.3 (now 41.3) was amended to its current language giving federal
courts broader discretion in forming custody orders for prevailing habeas petitioners.
See United States ex rel. Thomas v. State of New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 743 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). See generally E. Boesky & E. Gressman, The 1967
Changes in the Supreme Court Rules, 42 F.R.D. 139 (1967).

When the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were promulgated in 1967 the
same language added to Supreme Court Rule 49.3 (now 41.3) was installed into Fed.
R. App. P. 23(c).
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contrast, it is presumed an unsuccessful petitioner will remain incarcerated. 27 The rule also creates a presumption of correctness in an
initial custody order; it will not be modified absent a showing of

"special reasons.'

'28

Although Rule 23(c) governs a federal court ruling on a motion
to stay the release of a successful habeas petitioner pending appeal,

its vague wording has made the rule difficult for courts to implement

uniformly. 29 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hilton v.

Braunskill,30 federal judges were without uniform standards to decide
what was sufficient to rebut the presumption of release accorded a
successful petitioner under Rule 23(c). 31 The conflict revolving around

27. See FED. R. App. P. 23(b). This rules provides in part:
the prisoner may be detained in the custody from which release is sought,
or in other appropriate custody, or may be enlarged upon the prisoner's
recognizance, with or without surety as may appear fitting to the court or
justice or judge rendering the decision, or to the court of appeals or to the
Supreme Court, or to a judge or justice of either court.
Id. See, e.g., Walberg v. Israel, 776 F.2d 134, 136 (7th Cir. 1985) (since Rule 23(c)
carries a presumption of release, the "as may appear fitting to the court or justice
or judge" language of Rule 23(b) carries a presumption of continued detention).
28. See FED. R. App. P. 23(d). This rule provides:
An initial order respecting the custody or enlargement of the prisoner and
any recognizance or surety taken, shall govern review in the court of appeals
and in the Supreme Court unless for special reasons shown to the court of
appeals or to the Supreme Court, or to a judge or justice of either court,
the order shall be modified, or an independent order respecting custody,
enlargement or surety shall be made.
Id. See, e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (1987) ("Rule 23(d) creates
a presumption of correctness for the order of a district court").
29. See supra note 26. See also Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 994 & 997
n.5 (3d Cir. 1986) (the court described Rule 23 as a "sparsely worded" rule upon
which "[r]elatively little has been written with respect to [its] interpretation.").
30. 107 S.Ct. 2113 (1987).
31. Lacking uniform standards, federal courts have recognized a variety of
factors to rebut the presumption of release under Rule 23(c). Some federal courts
have held the presumption may be rebutted if the state can show it has a strong case
with which it may reimprison the habeas petitioner if it loses on the appeal. See,
e.g., Walberg v. Israel, 776 F.2d 134, 136 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the presumption of release under Rule 23(c) "can easily be rebutted by showing that the state is
quite likely to . . . reconvict, and reimprison the applicant"); Woods v. Closen, 637
F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (E. D. Wis. 1986) (presumption of release may be rebutted by
likelihood of reconviction by the state). Other federal courts have predicated release
on the same standards used to determine whether to grant bail to a pretrial detainee
since the petitioner still has a valid state indictment. See, e.g., Sellars v. Estelle, 450
F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (state has opportunity to show prevailing
habeas petitioner poses a danger to the community); United States ex rel. Taylor v

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

this lack of uniformity turned on the concept of federalism,3 2 the
state's interest in retaining custody,33 and the successful petitioner's
34
liberty interest.
An example of this conflict is found in Carter v. Rafferty.3 5 In
Carter, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was presented with
a motion by the state of New Jersey to reincarcerate 6 a successful
petitioner pending the state's appeal of an order granting habeas
Redman, 500 F. Supp. 453, 459 (D. Del. 1980) (court considers dangerousness of
successful habeas petitioner in determining whether to grant the state's motion for a
stay of enlargement pending appeal). But see, e.g., Ostrer v. United States, 584 F.2d
594, 599 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The eligibility of a habeas petitioner for bail is not on the
same footing as that of a pretrial accused. . ."); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499,
507 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The release on bail of state prisoners seeking habeas corpus
relief in federal court is . . . not [governed] by the provisions of the Bail Reform
Act."); Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 995 (3d Cir 1986) ("it is clear that federal
statutory bail standards ... do not govern release of state prisoners under Rule 23(c)
and (d)").
A third category of federal courts have used the same standards in determining
whether to stay the release of a successful habeas petitioner as are used in determining
whether to stay civil judgments. See, e.g., Clark v. Rose, 611 F. Supp 294 (M.D.
Tenn. 1983); Perez v Wainwright, 440 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Johnson v.
Scully, 563 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Cagle v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.
Tenn. 1980).
It is somewhat surprising, since habeas proceedings are civil in nature, see supra
note 11, that the civil stay standards are not used more often in the habeas*context.
There are, however, two important reasons their use has been limited. The first arises
from the Supreme Court decision of Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 (1969), in
which the Court stated that "[h]abeas corpus practice in the federal courts has
conformed with civil practice in only a general sense."
The second reason federal courts have been hesitant to apply the civil stay standards
in the habeas context arises from FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a)(2). This rule limits the use
of civil rules in habeas proceedings "to the extent that the practice in such proceedings
is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the
practice in civil actions." FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a)(2). Since habeas proceedings are
governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256 (1982), the use of civil rules in those proceedings
has not been widespread when determining whether to enlarge a successful habeas
petitioner. Specifically, the only instances in which the circuit courts have used FED.
R. App. P. 8(a), the rule governing those court's decision to stay civil judgments,
has been to decide if the state must seek a stay of enlargement in the district court
prior to bringing the motion to the circuit court. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Barnwell v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 768, 769 (3d Cir. 1972); Walberg v. Israel, 776 F.2d
134, 135 (7th Cir. 1985).
32. See supra note 16.
33. See supra note 4.
34. See supra note 3.
35. 781 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1986).
36. Id. at 994 n.l. The state sought to reincarcerate the habeas petitioner
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relief.37 In its motion, the state argued a traditional interest in public
safety as a reason for reincarceration. The state asserted the successful
petitioner was a "dangerous" individual who should remain in custody
pending appeal.38

The Third Circuit found it impossible to make a custody deter-

mination under Rule 23(c) based on "dangerousness"

since such a

factor was traditionally reserved for the state's consideration.3 9 The

court emphasized that "[rielease may only be challenged ... if
matters are put in issue relating to a petitioner's ability to respond to

federal process, or which in some other respect relate to a federal

interest. '"40 According to the Carter opinion, the primary role of a
federal court in a habeas proceeding is to determine whether a

"constitutional infirmity infected the defendant's trial." ' 4' Once a
a
constitutional infirmity is found to exist, only matters relating to
42
federal interest may be used to rebut the presumption of release.
In Hilton v. Braunskil143 the Supreme Court, despite the third
circuit's reasoning in Carter, adopted an approach which allows the

state to assert an interest in public safety as a means of obtaining a

stay of a successful petitioner's release pending appeal. 4 In Hilton
the Court held the same factors which guide federal courts in deter-

mining whether to stay civil judgments are applicable under Rule
23(c) .
Through the adoption of civil stay standards, the Court attempted

to balance the state's public safety concerns" with the habeas petibecause the district court had ordered his immediate release rather than ordering a
conditional writ.
37. Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 994 (3d Cir. 1986).
38. Id.

39. Id. at 996. In making this determination, the court in Carter stated that no
federal statute had been brought to its attention that prescribed procedures or
substantive remedies for the civil or criminal commitment of state prisoners where
the dangerousness of the individual was advocated for such detention. The court
further stated that "the determination of 'dangerousness' can only be made by the
state in accordance with state procedures." Id.
40. Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1986).
41. Id. at 996.
42. Id. at 995. The court in Carter stated that "if the State's application to
revoke enlargement were related to Carter's likelihood of response to federal process,
there is no question but that we would act under our power and authority to enter
whatever constitutionally permissible order we deemed necessary to ensure that
response." Id.
43. 107 S. Ct. 2113 (1987).
44. Id. at 2119.
45. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
46. See supra note 4.
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tioner's liberty interest once the state conviction has been rendered
invalid. 47 The Court avoided the fundamental issue addressed in Carter
by explaining that federal habeas jurisdiction itself puts the strain on
federalism, not added discretion in making custody orders under Rule
23(c) .4

Although the Court believed civil stay standards might strike an
appropriate balance between state and individual interests, those
standards may be inappropriate for achieving that balance in habeas
corpus proceedings. Depending on what factors the Court intended
federal judges to emphasize under the civil standards, the state may
invariably be overprotected to the detriment of a habeas petitioner's
liberty interest. 49 Whether the civil stay standards adequately balance
these competing interests will next be analyzed.

III.
A.

HILTON V. BRAUNSKILL

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A New Jersey state court convicted Dana Braunskill of first
degree sexual assault 0 and fourth degree unlawful possession of a
knife5 on January 30, 1981. He was sentenced to an aggregate term
of eight years in the New Jersey State Prison. These convictions were
affirmed on appeal to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
47. See supra note 14.
48. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (1987). The adoption of the
civil stay standards does impact the concept of federalism in a unique way. Under
the civil stay standards the state may obtain a stay of release based upon its traditional
interest in public safety. In order to get a stay, fhe state needs to show the habeas
petitioner poses a threat to this interest by being a "dangerous" individual. If the
state shows the habeas petitioner to be a danger, a federal court could stay the release
of a successful petitioner whose state conviction has been rendered invalid, see supra
note 14, when under the law of the state in which convicted a consideration of
dangerousness may not be made in determining whether pretrial release is appropriate.
See B. Gottlieb, Public Danger as a Factor in Pre-Trial Release: A Comparative
Analysis of State Laws, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. 11, 25 (1985) (eighteen states preclude
pretrial detention based on a consideration of dangerousness). See also Hilton v.
Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2121 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Federal Rules
of Procedure cannot supplant either substantive rights guaranteed under the state law
or the state processes developed to enforce those rights").
The adoption of the civil stay standards under Rule 23(c) may have a greater
and more far reaching impact on federalism than discussed, but those issues are
beyond the scope of this Note.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 91-106.
50. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 1982).
51. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5 (West 1982).
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Division, and his petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme
Court was denied on March 1, 1983.
On April 26, 1985, Braunskill filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey.5 2 The district court found that, due to local court rules,"5 4
Braunskill had not been allowed to call witnesses in his own defense
in violation of the sixth amendment." Upon this finding, the court
ordered a writ of habeas corpus to issue56 in thirty days to allow the
state an opportunity to retry Braunskill.
Subsequent to the district court's issuance of the conditional writ,
the State of New Jersey filed a notice of appeal in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The state also presented a
motion to the district court for a stay of its order pending the appeal.
The state, in its motion for a stay, asserted Braunskill represented a
danger to the public who should remain incarcerated pending appeal."
5
The district court denied the state's motion for a stay of release " by
59
relying on the earlier Third Circuit opinion of Carter v. Rafferty.
In Carter the Third Circuit held potential dangerousness could not be
considered when deciding whether to stay the release of a successful
petitioner pending appeal. 60 The district court's order denying the 61stay
was also appealed and summarily affirmed by the Third Circuit.
B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Supreme Court began discussion by reviewing the Third
Circuit's Carter opinion. It stated federal courts are not as restricted

14.

52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See also supra text accompanying notes 10-

53. See N.J. CT. R. 3:11-1. This rule provides that if a defendant intends to
call an alibi witness, a bill of particulars must be provided on demand of the
prosecuting attorney. In this case, Braunskill's attorney failed to file a timely notice
of alibi testimony. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2123 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
54. Braunskill v. Hilton, 629 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1986).
55. The sixth amendment provides that an accused shall have the right "to
have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor". U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
56. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Braunskill v. Hilton, 629 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1986) (district court's order
denying stay of writ).
58. Id.

59. 781 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1986).
60. Id. at 996.
61. Since the third circuit summarily affirmed the district court's order denying
the stay, it can only be assumed that it, too, relied on its previous Carter opinion.
See Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 n.3 (1987).
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as the Third Circuit believed when presented with a motion to stay
the release of a successful habeas petitioner. 62 Specifically, the Court
rejected the opinion that a factor such as the potential dangerousness
of successful petitioners could not be considered in deciding whether
release was appropriate under Rule 23(c) and (d). 63
The Court in Hilton examined the general terms of Rule 23 and
found potential dangerousness a factor to be considered in making
and modifying custody orders. 64 The Court conceded Rule 23(c)
creates a presumption of release for the successful habeas petitioner.
It explained, however, that this presumption may be overcome if the
judge making the initial custody decision "otherwise orders. ' 65 It also
found Rule 23(d) creates a presumption of correctness in the initial
custody determination. This presumption, however, may be overcome
in the appellate court "for special reasons shown." '66 To cast some
light on factors which may prompt a federal court to "otherwise
order" or what "special reasons" are needed to modify an initial
custody order, the Court looked to the history of habeas practice in
67
the federal courts.
The Court found its previous opinions had consistently held
federal courts could delay release of successful habeas petitioners to
allow the state an opportunity to correct the constitutional defect
through retrial. 68 Such delays were allowed even when Supreme Court
Rule 34, with its mandatory release language, was in operation. 69
Release may be delayed because of the Court's interpretation of the
predecessor of section 2243 of Title 28, United States Code 70 as giving
federal courts "the largest power to control and direct the form of

62. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2118.
63. Id. at 2119. Rule 23(d) provides a presumption of correctness in the initial
custody order. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The Court's decision in
Hilton to incorporate the civil stay standards applies to both an initial order under
Rule 23(c) and a modification of that order under Rule 23(d).
64. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987).
65. Id. at 2118. See also supra note 26.

66. Id. See also supra note 28.

67. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2118.
68. Id. See supra note 19. See also Whitley v. Warden, Wyoming State
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 569 (1971) ("we reverse ... and remand with directions
that the writ is to issue unless the state makes appropriate arrangements to retry
petitioner."); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) ("on remand, the District
Court should enter such orders ... which allow the State a reasonable time in which
to retry petitioner.").

69. Id. See also supra note 26.

70. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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judgment to be entered in cases brought before it on habeas corpus. ''71
The Court reasoned it would "make little sense" if the broad discretion federal courts have in granting habeas relief was to "evaporate"
when the decision becomes whether release should be stayed pending
72
appeal.
Since the Court determined federal courts have broad discretion
in deciding whether to stay release, it needed to formulate guidelines
for judges in using this discretion. To identify what these guidelines
ought to be, the Court looked to its previous habeas corpus decisions.
It found these decisions had consistently held habeas proceedings to
be civil in nature. 73 Furthermore, when individual members of the
Court had been confronted with whether or not to stay the release of
habeas petitioners pending disposition of a state's petition for certiorari, their approach "has been to follow the general standards for
staying a civil judgment." ' 74 As such, the Court stated it was "logical
to conclude" standards governing stays of civil judgments should be
used as guidelines in determining whether 75to stay the release of
successful habeas petitioners pending appeal.
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) 76 governs a
district court's power to stay civil judgments pending appeal, and
77
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) governs courts of appeal
in making that determination, the same factors are generally consid71. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (1987) (quoting In re Bonner,
151 U.S. 242, 261 (1894)).
72. Id.
73. See supra note 11.
74. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2118. See, e.g., Tate v. Rose, 466 U.S. 1301 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., in chambers); Sumner v. Mata, 446 U.S. 1302 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
in chambers). Although the approach taken in these cases may have been to follow
the general standards for staying a civil judgment, the order to stay release was not
pursuant to Rule 23(c) or (d). The decision to stay the petitioner's release in these
cases was based on the power of the Court or an individual Justice of the Court to
stay an order pending disposition of a petition for certiorari. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(0
(1982).
75. Hilton, 107 S.Ct. at 2118-2119.
76. See FED. R. Crv. P. 62(c). This rule provides in part:
When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting,
dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend,
modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal
upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the
security of the rights of the adverse party.
Id.
77. See FED. R. App. P. 8(a). This rule provides in part:
Application for a stay of the judgment order of a district court pending
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ered under both rules. The Court found these factors to be: "1)
whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely
to succeed on the merits; 2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; 3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceedings; and 4) where
'7s
the public interest lies."
Using the civil stay factors, the Court held both the presumption
of release under Rule 23(c) and the presumption of correctness given
an initial custody order under Rule 23(d) may be overcome "if the
traditional stay factors so indicate."7 9 The traditional stay factors give
both a court making an initial custody order, and a court reviewing
that order, more discretion than the Third Circuit's Carter opinion.
The Carter opinion emphasized cognizance of only factors directly
involving federal interests. s0 The Court's decision in Hilton, to use
the traditional stay factors of civil cases, allows a federal court to
consider the state's interest when determining whether to stay a
successful petitioner's release.
In Carter, the Third Circuit stated the possibility of flight could
be considered so as to assure the petitioner would be available for
further federal proceedings.8 ' The Supreme Court agreed this factor
should be recognized under the traditional civil stay standards now to
be used. 2 Under the traditional civil stay factors, however, the Court
also found that "if the state establishes that there is a risk that the
prisoner will pose a danger to the public if released, the court may
take that factor into consideration in determining whether or not to
enlarge him." 3 Furthermore, factors such as the state's interest in
"continuing custody and rehabilitation" may now be considered. 4
The Court explained that since a habeas petitioner's interest in being

Id.

appeal, or for approval of a superdeas bond, or for an order suspending,
modifying, restoring or granting an injunction during the pendency of an
appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in the district court.

78. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987). See, e.g., O'Bryan v.
Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453
(11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).; Accident Fund v. Baerwaldt,
579 F. Supp. 724, 725 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
79. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2119.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
81. See Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1986).
82. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987).
83. Id. "Enlargement" means to "release from confinement, servitude, or
distress." WEBSTER'S NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 754 (1971).
84. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2119.
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released pending appeal is "always substantial," it will be considered
strongly when a showing of risk of flight, dangerousness, or the
5
state's interest in "continuing custody and rehabilitation" is weak.
The determining factor of whether to stay release of successful habeas
petitioners may be whether the state has a strong likelihood of success
on appeal. If the state establishes a strong likelihood of success on
appeal, or at least a "substantial case on the merits," custody may
be continued if the state would be irreparably injured absent the stay
86
and the public interest "militates against release." If the state cannot
show it has a strong case on the merits 87of an appeal, then the
presumption for release will be controlling.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

THE CIVIL STANDARDS

Although the use of civil standards in the habeas context is
somewhat unique,88 the critical impact of the decision lies in how the
factors used under those standards are balanced. There are two
impediments to using the civil stay standards under Rule 23(c). The
first impediment is the method of weighing the competing state and
individual interests, as articulated by the Court, does not adequately
balance these interests thereby impairing a habeas petitioner's liberty
interest.8 9 The second is even if an adequate balance might be achieved
under the civil standards, continued incarceration based upon "dan9°
gerousness" raises serious due process concerns.
85. Id. The Court explained that the state's interest in "continuing custody and
rehabilitation" will be weakest where the habeas petitioner has only a short time left
to serve on the state's sentence. Id.
86. Id. at 2120.
87. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (1987).
88. See supra note 31. The court stated that neither its previous Harrisopinion
nor FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2) prevented the adoption of the civil stay standards under
Rule 23(c). "Where, as here, the need is evident for principles to guide the conduct
of habeas proceedings it is entirely appropriate to use . . . [general civil] rules by
analogy or otherwise." Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2118-19 n.5 (1987).
Federal courts have applied specific civil rules of procedure in the past to habeas
proceedings. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1982) (FED. R.
Crv. P. 56 on summary judgments); Sassoon v. United States, 549 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.
1977) (FED. R. Crv. P. 58 on entry of judgments); Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D.
389 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (FED. R. CIrv. P. 23 on class actions); Lyles v. Beto, 32 F.R.D.
248 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e) on subpoenas); Passic v. State, 98 F.
Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (FED. R. Crv. P. 8 on the general rules of pleading).
89. See supra note 3.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 107-35.
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The adoption of the civil stay standards under Rule 23(c) and (d)
overprotects the state's interest in public safety. In Hilton, the Court
held that if the state can "demonstrate a substantial case on the
merits of their appeal, continued custody is permissible if the second
and fourth factors in the traditional stay analysis militate against
release." 9' Under this analysis, a successful habeas petitioner will find
release difficult to obtain due to what constitutes the second and
fourth factors of the civil stay standard.
The second factor of the civil stay standard is "whether the stay
applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay." 9 2 Since federal
courts generally grant habeas relief through conditional writs, which
allow the state an opportunity to correct the constitutional defect, 93
the state must make a choice of initiating retrial proceedings or
appealing the issuance of the conditional writ. If the state appeals the
issuance of the writ and cannot obtain the stay of a "dangerous"
petitioner's release, it loses the objective of ensuring public safety by
preventing the release of dangerous individuals. 94 If a state initiates
procedures for the retrial of a successful petitioner, the federal courts,
bound by considerations of comity, would have to refrain from
entertaining the state's appeal of the issuance of the writ to avoid
disrupting the ongoing state criminal prosecution. 95 In either situation,
through the release of a dangerous individual or through taking a
state's right to appeal, 96 a state would be "irreparably injured absent
a stay."
The fourth factor of the civil stay standard is a consideration of
"where the public interest lies. ''97 In Hilton, the Court stated
that
under this standard the state may show "there is a risk that the
prisoner will pose a danger to the public if released." The Court,
however, left open the question of what constitutes a "danger to the
public" and what the state might use to prove that such danger exists.
Under the Bail Reform Act of 198498 a federal pretrial arrestee may
be kept in custody pending trial if it is determined he or she poses a
91.
92.
93.
94.

Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119-20 (1987).
Id. at 2119.
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4.

95. See supra note 23.

96. When the normal course of appellate review might otherwise cause the
state's case to become moot, issuance of a stay is warranted. See, e.g., Garrison v.
Hudson, 468 U.S. 1301, 1302 (Burger, C.J., Circuit Justice, 1984); In re Bart, 82 S.
Ct. 675, 676 (Warren, C.J., Circuit Justice, 1962).
97. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987).
98. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1985).
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danger to the community.9 9 The Act is concerned with the possible
commission of future crimes by the defendant if released pending trial
and it must be shown by "clear and convincing evidence that no
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person."' ° In the habeas context however, the Court set
no guidelines as to whether the state must show the habeas petitioner

is likely to commit further crimes pending the state's appeal to obtain
a stay of release or whether the state may show a danger exists in
some other way. In the State of New Jersey's motion to stay the
release of Braunskill, the state attempted to use the conviction on
which Braunskill had been granted habeas relief as proof of his
dangerousness.10° This conviction had been rendered void by the
02
district court's order granting habeas relief. If a state's motion to

stay the successful petitioner's release pending appeal can include the
invalid conviction as proof of dangerousness, the state will easily

a risk that the prisoner will pose a danger to the public
show "there is
03
if released." 1

If the fourth factor of the civil stay standard may be met by the

now invalid conviction and the second factor is met due to the nature
of conditional writs, 1°4 the state may obtain a stay of the petitioner's
release simply by showing a "substantial case on the merits of their

appeal"'' 5 because the second and forth factors will invariably "militate against release."1o6

B. DUE PROCESS
Even if an adequate. balance can be achieved under the civil stay
standards, due process concerns may prevent federal courts from
99. See id. at § 3142(e). This statute provides: "If, after a hearing . . . , the
judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions of release will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to
trial." Id.
100. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987). See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598
F. Supp. 1442, 1450 (N.D. I11.1984).
101. See Braunskill v. Hilton, No. 85-2008 (D.N.J. 1986) (order denying stay of
release). See also Petitioner's Brief at 40, Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113 (1987)
("There can be no better predicator of dangerousness than that which exists in this
case-a state court jury has convicted the defendant of a crime of dangerousness.
The fact that a district court has found a single infirmity in that conviction does not
detract from this argument").
102. See supra note 14.
103. 107 S. Ct. at 2119.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
105. 107 S. Ct. at 2120.
106. Id.
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considering the state's public safety interest. In Hilton, the Court held
substantive due process would not be violated if federal courts were
to consider the habeas petitioner's dangerousness when deciding
whether continued incarceration pending appeal is appropriate under
Rule 23(c). 07 This decision was based on the previous Supreme Court
opinion of United States v. Salerno.0 8 In Salerno, the Court upheld
the provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 which allows federal
pretrial detention based on a consideration of the arrestee's potential
dangerousness. 109
In Hilton, the Court stated a successful habeas petitioner was in
an even "less favorable" position than a pretrial detainee because a
habeas petitioner had already been adjudged guilty by a state court."10
Even though this conviction was later held to be "constitutionally
infirm" by a federal district court, the Court reasoned that the district
court's decision may be overturned on appeal prior to the state
resorting to a retrial of the habeas petitioner."' According to the
Court, the Due Process Clause, therefore, would not prevent federal
courts from considering the habeas petitioner's potential dangerousness when determining whether release from custody is appropriate
pending the state's appeal. 112
The Court's analogy between a federal pretrial detainee under
the Bail Reform Act and a successful state habeas petitioner, however,
is imperfect. Although federal bail laws are inapplicable to state
habeas petitioners,"' the Court found a successful habeas petitioner
to be in an even less favorable position than a pretrial detainee to
challenge detention because the habeas petitioner had been adjudged
guilty in state court. This reasoning, however, "trivializes the District
Court's ruling that the state obtained its conviction in violation of
the [habeas petitioner's] constitutional rights . . . [t]he fact that the
107. Id.

108. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. The Court in Salerno rejected
the contention that basing pretrial detention on the arrestee's potential dangerousness
violated concepts of due process. The majority found that the Bail Reform Act of
1984 did not constitute punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt because it was
regulatory in nature. See infra text accompanying notes 118-22. Since the prevention
of crime is a legitimate regulator goal and the government's interest in preventing
that crime was compelling, the Court found no due process violation. Furthermore,
the Act contains procedural safeguards to prevent unwarranted and unnecessary
deprivation of the arrestee's liberty. See infra notes 129 & 132.
110. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (1987).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 31.
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4
ruling might later be reversed does not diminish its current validity.""
The traditional function of the writ of habeas corpus is to release an
individual from illegal custody." 5 As such, release should be prompt
unless a state initiates retrial proceedings.
The Court has held a determination of dangerousness may allow
the continued detention of successful habeas petitioners pending the
state's appeal' 6 and of a pretrial detainee under the Bail Reform Act
of 1984.1 7 Holding detention does not violate due process under the
Bail Reform Act, however, does not mean due process is not violated
when detention under Rule 23(c) is based upon a consideration of
dangerousness.
An important factor in determining detention violates substantive
due process is whether such detention constitutes punishment "prior
to an adjudication of guilt.""' In Salerno, the Court held pretrial
detention, when based on a consideration of dangerousness, did not
violate due process"19 because such detention was regulatory in nature
rather than punishment. 20 The Court found "Itihe legislative history
of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not
formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a
' 2
potential solution to a pressing societal problem.' ' Since the Act
was deemed to be regulatory in nature and the "governments interest
in preventing crime. . . is both legitimate and compelling," the Court
process. 22
held pretrial detention under the Act did not violate due
In contrast, the Court's decision in Hilton specifically refers to
the state's interest in "custody and rehabilitation" of the successful
habeas petitioner as a factor to consider under Rule 23(c) and the
civil standards.1 23 It is difficult to imagine a more likely synonym for
"custody and rehabilitation" than "punishment."
Although the Court has upheld predictors of dangerousness that
impact liberty interests in other contexts, these decisions were all
24
based on situations in which a valid conviction existed. When a

114. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2121 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
115. See supra note 8.
116. Hilton v.Braunskill, 107 S.Ct. 2113 (1987).
117. United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987).
118. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
119. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2105.
120. Id.at 2101.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987).
124. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875
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district court grants habeas relief, the state conviction is rendered
"null and void" for purposes of confinement 21 and provides
"no
basis for the continuation of punishment, or as the majority so
delicately puts it, continuing custody and rehabilitation.1 ' 26
The distinction between a successful state habeas petitioner and
a federal pretrial detainee under the Bail Reform Act is further
exemplified through the procedures by which the Act must be implemented to withstand due process scrutiny. In Salerno, the majority
held detention based on dangerousness did not violate due process
under the Act because of Congress' "careful delineation of the
circumstances under which detention will be permitted."127 Unlike the
judicial balancing test the Court in Hilton approved to decide whether
release of a successful petitioner is appropriate under Rule 23(c),1 28
the Act contains procedural safeguards to avoid unwarranted and
erroneous deprivations of liberty.129 When the Court turned its attention to whether a determination of dangerousness ought to permit a
federal court to continue detaining a successful habeas petitioner,
however, the majority "disregard[ed] the total absence of safeguards
against erroneous deprivations of liberty."30
Despite the possible due process violation the civil stay standards
may entail when the petitioner's dangerousness is considered under
Rule 23(c), the civil standards may be an appropriate method of
balancing the state's and the individual's interests. To make the civil
standards workable, however, specific guidelines need to be imple(1976) (the Court upheld a death penalty statute that allowed the jury to consider
the likelihood that the defendant would engage in future anti-social conduct);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 422 U.S. 1 (1979)
(Court held that parole boards may properly attempt to predict dangerous behavior
in making parole decisions); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (Court upheld
the constitutionality of using the testimony of a psychiatrist at the penalty phase of
a capital case which included a prediction that the convicted murderer was likely to
engage in future violent conduct).
125. See supra note 14.

126. Hilton, 107 S.Ct. at 2123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987).
128. Hilton, 107 S.Ct. at 2119.

129. See, e.g., The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §3142(f) (West 1985).
Under this section a detention hearing is available only if the case involves a crime
of violence; is an offense for which the sentence is life imprisonment or death; is a
drug related offense; or involves certain repeat offenders. Furthermore, the arrestee
is entitled to a prompt hearing and the maximum length of detention is limited by
the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (West 1985). See
generally Note, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 55 U.
CN. L. REV. 153 (1986).

130. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2123 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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mented concerning how a determination of dangerousness is to be
made. If, as under the Bail Reform Act, the state must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" 13 ' that the successful petitioner represents a danger to the community, the petitioner's liberty interest
may be overcome. Furthermore, procedures must be implemented
through which the likelihood of future dangerousness can be accurately determined. 3 2 Basing the likelihood of future dangerousness on
33
an invalid conviction should not be an acceptable method.' The
Court has stated that "there is nothing inherently unattainable about
' 3 4 If this is true, specific
a prediction of future criminal conduct.'
methods of obtaining this prediction should be included in the Hilton
balancing test prior to having a successful petitioner's "substantial
interest"' 35 in being released overcome.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Hilton v. Braunskill lays important
groundwork upon which to build. The Court held federal courts
should use the same standards when determining whether to keep a
successful habeas petitioner in custody pending appeal as are used in
3 6 Under the civil standetermining whether to stay civil judgments.
dards, federal courts may consider the state's interest in public safety
Rule 23(c) and (d) of the Federal
when making custody orders under
1 37
Procedure.
Appellate
of
Rules
Despite the Third Circuit's opinion in Carter v. Rafferty,"' which
held only federal interests were cognizable when making a custody
order under Rule 23(c), 139 the state's interest in public safety should
4
be recognized. Due to the nature of a conditional writ,' 0 the form of
131. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 the
government must prove its case for detention by a clear and convincing evidence
standard. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (West 1985).
132. See Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103. In Salerno, the Court stated that under
the Bail Reform Act, "the procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the
likelihood of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further the accuracy
of that determination." Id.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987) (quoting Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
135. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
138. 781 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1986).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
140. See supra note 20.
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relief generally granted in habeas proceedings, the state could not
promote this interest without losing the opportunity to appeal an
order granting habeas relief.14 ' The state faced the option of initiating
possibly unneeded retrial proceedings, if an appeal would have been
successful, or appealing the issuance of the writ and having an
individual it considered dangerous be released pending appeal. 142
While the civil standards allow a state the opportunity of insuring
its interest in public safety, those standards may overprotect that
interest in violation of the habeas petitioner's due process rights. 14
The petitioner's due process right rests on the condition that he or
she not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.'" Since the
petitioner's state conviction has been rendered invalid by a district
court granting habeas relief, continued detention would appear violative of due process. 145 Though it appears a petitioner's "substantial
interest" in being released is not adequately protected under the civil
standards, additional safeguards could make those standards workable
when used in the habeas context. The civil standards alone, without
further guidelines governing their use in habeas proceedings, will
make it very difficult for a successful habeas petitioner to obtain
release pending the state's appeal.1 46 A strange result indeed when one
considers that a successful petitioner's release was mandatory prior
to the 1967 amendments to the rule governing custody in such cases. 147
To adequately balance the successful petitioner's strong liberty
interest with the state's public safety concerns, additional guidelines
should be incorporated into the civil standards when used under Rule
23(c). Such guidelines should include a definition of when a successful
petitioner would "pose a danger" if released. Without an adequate
definition, federal courts are lacking a basis by which to judge when
the habeas petitioner's liberty interest may be overcome, leading to
ad hoc custody determinations. Furthermore, procedures such as those
found under the Bail Reform Act,' 48 should be implemented in order
to make accurate determinations of when a danger exists and thereby
avoid unwarranted and erroneous deprivations of liberty.
Through the adoption of civil standards under Rule 23(c), the
Court, in Hilton, has made it clear the state's interest in public safety
141. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

142. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
143. See supra note 3.
144. See supra text accompanying note 118.
145. See supra note 14.

146. See supra text accompanying notes 91-106.
147. See supra note 26.

148. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
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is to be considered when federal courts make custody determinations
concerning successful state habeas petitioners pending appeal. However, without further clarification of how the state may prove its
"substantial
interest is in need of protection, the habeas petitioner's
149
overcome.
be
not
should
released
interest" in being
RONALD

149. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
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